The position that everything that is actual is necessary is called necessitarianism. Many of the views of Leibniz seem to lead to necessitarianism, for example, the theory that he came up with that the precipitate-concept is contained in the subject of all propositions that re true. In other words, Leibniz argued that all propositions that are true are analytic. One of his other views is the theory that the concept of a persons substance contains once and for all everything that will ever happen to that individual. This means that no individual substance exists in more than one possible world thereby implying that a person or an individual substance contains everything that is necessary. I believe however that these views by Leibniz do not actually lead to the strongest form of necessitarianism. In this paper, I will respond to Leibnizs theological implications since his views do not seem to fully lead to the strongest form of necessitarianism.
In a letter to Magnus Wedderkopf in 1671, Leibniz seems to embrace necessitarianism as a consequence of his major doctrine that God necessarily acts in the best possible way. Leibniz does not, however, hold this position for long. In a vital work that he did between 1672 and 1673 titled The Confession, Leibniz discusses in the and concludes by rejecting the initial position that he held reason being that necessitarianism is not as a consequence of commitments that he had theologically. What is found particularly intriguing is the fact that Leibniz did not at any point note or waiver the belief that he had that the existence of God was necessary? In the letter that Leibniz wrote to Wedderkopf, he concedes that the sins in the series of things, this is accompanied by everything else that follow from Gods existence. In the book titled Confessions, there is no point that Leibniz refutes this claim or seems to disagree with it. I also believe that the conclusion of necessitarianism is attained by appealing to the plausible modal principle that implies that necessity is closed under entailment.
Leibniz, however, denies the plausible moral principle that is used to derive a necessitarian consequence from his previous theological doctrines. He simply rejects the idea that necessity is closed under entailment in the first draft of Confession. He notes that it is not true that whatever follows what is considered necessary is necessary. However, in a paper that Leibniz wrote between the Confessions, Leibniz notes that whatever is considered incompatible with what is considered necessary is thus impossible. However, in later writings, I believe that Leibniz has a subtle approach than the stance he had previously taken when he notes that necessity is closed under entailment. It thus seems that the anti-necessitarianism argument has three parts. The first part is to identify the context in which the term necessary is to be used. The second part is the fact that people are worried about when they are worried, and they do not even know if necessitarianism in the actual world is actually necessary per se. the final part is to argue and in this instance correctly that per se necessity is not actually closed under entailment.
When Leibniz concedes that the best by a necessity of Gods nature is His will, I believe that in this argument, Leibniz does not mean necessarily that the things that are willed by God exist necessarily, where in this instance necessity is comprehended as per se necessity. The other argument supported by Leibniz is the perfection and existence of God which are in their own right per se necessary does not in any way entail per se necessity of the world that God has created. This is his argument even when he has already conceded that the best through His nature is Gods will. I believe this is so as it is always considered that the creations of God are the best of all possible worlds. This even when it is necessitated does not introduce any inconsistency that is internal to the strict concepts of non-actual possible worlds.
In order to respond to the commitments to necessitarianism by Leibniz, it is vital that his views are compared to those of Spinoza. However, there are some individuals who still critique that Spinoza was not a necessitation. However, after several readings, I know comprehend that Spinoza like Leibniz identifies that the created world is not per se vital due to the essences of finite modes that does not involve existence. I would argue that if necessity is comprehended as per se necessity and in other words contingency is comprehended as per se contingency, then it is safe to conclude that Spinoza is no more of a necessitation that Leibniz. The question that one asks oneself is to whether the inconsistencies with the arguments provided by Spinoza especially in regard to his commitment to necessitarianism makes him not a necessitarianism at all? I believe that the answer to that question is no.
There are various instances that Spinoza echoes the distinction of Leibniz in regard to the two-fold conception of impossibility. In regard to the interpretation offered by Curley, Spinoza provides a distinction between metaphysical necessity and eternal truths. I believe that metaphysical necessity is attached to God in regard to existence while the eternal truths pertain to the laws of nature and the causal necessity. These two concepts can be thought of as attaching to finite modes. The existence of these modes and activity is determined by the various series of causes that strict infinitely backwards in time. What is find intriguing with one of the passages of Spinoza is the argument that if things in the world would be different, then the nature of God would also be different. I believe that this statement rather implies that Spinoza has the belief or premonition that it is only the series of finite modes that actually exists that are consistent with the existence of God.
After reading the different passages, I believe that the correct way to comprehend both the positions that have been taken up by Leibniz and Spinoza is through the argument provided by Garrett in regard to comprehending Spinozas necessitarianism. Broader metaphysical necessity and per se necessity should not be thought of as different kinds of necessity or even different digress of necessity but they are the various ways in which something can be necessary.
I also believe that Leibniz sees that there is a genuine danger especially in the sort of necessitarianism that has the hold that everything that is actual is necessary. This means that at some level, it is vital to note that Leibniz has some anti-necessitarianism argument. The explanation that can be given in this instance is that if the world that was created by God is per se not necessary, then there need to be some explanations that have to be sought for the existence of the world. In this explanation, I believe that Leibniz believes that the goodness and the wisdom of the world lie in the worlds creator.
Concerning the argument of the plurality of worlds, I believe that this is the key aspect that differentiates between the philosophy of Spinoza and Leibniz. I think that it is implausible to reconstruct the position Spinoza that allows for a plurality of possible worlds. This may be due to the fact that Spinoza does not the goodness or wisdom of God. Additionally, the existence of the actual world is more directly conceptually entailed in the nature of God concerning Spinoza than it is regarding Leibniz. The mere fact that Leibniz believes that the goodness and the wisdom of God plays a vital role in the explanation of the existence of the actual world contributes to the fundamental variance between necessitarianism on the viewpoint of Leibniz and that of Spinoza.
In conclusion, the position that everything that is actual is necessary is called necessitarianism. After reading the different passages, I believe that the correct way to comprehend both the positions that have been taken up by Leibniz and Spinoza is through the argument provided by Garrett in regard to comprehending Spinozas necessitarianism. I also believe that Leibniz sees that there is a genuine danger especially in the sort of necessitarianism that has the hold that everything that is actual is necessary.
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