Case Study Example on Financing of R.K. Maroon Company

Introduction

R.K. Maroon is a seed-stage web-oriented entertainment company with important intellectual property. RKM's founders, all technology experts in the relevant area, are anticipating a quick leap to dot-com fortune and believe that their unique intellectual property will allow them to achieve a subsequent (year 3) $100,000,000 venture value with a one-time initial $2,000,000 in venture financing.

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In contrast, similar dot-commers in their niche are currently seeking multistage financing amounting to $10,000,000 to achieve comparable results. The founders have organized with 1,000,000 shares and are willing to grant venture investors a 100% return on their business plan projections.

A. Percent of Ownership

B. Resulting Configuration of Shared Ownership?

C. What if the venture investors don't buy the business plan predictions?

They also want to price the deal assuming a second round in year 2 of $8,000,000 with a 40% return.

D. What if the venture investors agree with the founders' assessment?

What is the impact on the founders and round one investor's final ownership assuming the second round is funded by outsiders?

Compare these to your results for Part C.

Compared to the results in part C, the first round of investors will keep more percent of the company IN the results of C than in part D

Who bears the dilution from an anticipated round?

Founders bear the cost of all rounds anticipated by the first round of investors 3. Who bears the dilution from an unanticipated round?

Fist round of investors fails to anticipate a second round. This might cause these first-round investors will bear some of the dilutions

Conclusion

What do you conclude about the impact of anticipated but unrealized subsequent financing rounds?

In the beginning, the first-round investors got share allocations that protected them from second-round dilution, while the founders bore the hedging of the first-round investors. On the other hand, if the second round never arrives, first-round investors will benefit a lot because they didn't bear the anticipated dilution. Meanwhile, founders and first-round would not have an incentive to have a bonus arrangement unless this helps them to avoid a second round.